The United States cannot afford to be the world’s policeman. We’re broke and our economy is in deep trouble. But since we are the last remaining superpower, we do have responsibilities. Accordingly, our military must be drastically reformed and restructured for the 21st century. The Pentagon learned from the Vietnam War; most of the major mistakes there were not repeated here. Still, every aspect of this operation must be carefully examined, from the role of women in the service, to serving married couples, to the reserve units designated for combat round-outs. The idea of an all-volunteer Army needs to be re-examined in terms of cost-effectiveness versus an Army of draftees that may not be as efficient but would certainly be less costly and more democratic. And we should look again at weapons systems so questionable their sponsors declined to use them in the gulf: the Air Force’s B-1 bomber, for example.
Seldom will a military machine have the time we had in the gulf. Only a military amateur like Saddam would allow his foe to grow strong right in front of his foxholes. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf had more than six months to develop the right mix of forces, and he needed every last day. We did not have enough fast ships or cargo aircraft to move our forces quickly, and the forces’ supply bins had been allowed to be drawn down to a dangerous level of spare parts, ammo and other essential gear. Our initial forces got over here with their shirttails hanging out.
The forces deployed beginning in August would have been nothing more than a speed bump in the desert if Iraqi tank columns had charged into Saudi Arabia. A key lesson from this exercise is that the Pentagon needs a fast-moving, hard-hitting three-division-size reaction force modeled after the USMC expeditionary force that arrived here in August with the first heavy tanks and a 60-day level of supplies and ammo. This force was ready to fight, but not heavy enough to sustain a strong attack. The military also needs a lightweight air-transportable tank with the wallop of the 65-ton Abrams. It needs a new generation of antitank weapons–not only technologically modern, but rugged, too.
Air power did a most impressive job and virtually won this war by itself. Air was the hammer and the ground and naval forces were the anvil. Air power worked here because of the desert terrain; once the allies achieved air supremacy, air-to-ground attacks could continue unimpeded. Few future battlefields will be similar. This campaign cannot serve as a model for the future. America must have a balanced reaction force with sea- and airlift designed for a mix of air, ground and sea missions.
Pre-positioning of gear in volatile regions is important. For more than 30 years the Pentagon has called for pre-positioned hardware in the gulf region. This time the Marines had gear on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and the concept worked well. It would also help to have regular multinational military deployments in the gulf, similar to NATO’s annual “Reforger” exercises.
Training needs to change, too. Although our soldiers are of the highest quality, they still do not train realistically enough for war. There is too much emphasis on safety. As a result, units do not train for integrated combat in a live-fire environment, where artillery, armed helicopters, close airsupport jets, armored vehicles and soldiers replicate the violent and confusing conditions found on the battlefield. You don’t learn football by going to the gym and watching videotapes. You learn by getting bruised on the field. As a result, there have been too many friendly-fire casualties, especially with air attacks on armor. An idea would be to have an IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) black box aboard all vehicles, just as on aircraft. The pilot would get ID before firing.
Finally, we must not make the mistake Congress almost made at the end of the cold war. Even as Saddam was preparing to roll into Kuwait, the peace-dividend gang were preparing to cut the military to the bone with their own “Farewell to Arms.” Had Saddam simply waited until 1992, these lawmakers would have assured his victory, and the world would have had a new oil baron.
I hope this war is the last high-intensity war I see in my lifetime. I oppose war because I know its consequences: there are no winners. This is even more clear now that the destructive capability of weaponry is so total and weapons are so precise. War is no longer a group of merry men meeting on top of a sunny hill, such as at Hastings in 1066, and swinging axes at each other before retiring to the pub for a few glasses of ale. The bottom line: we have to fight better, but it’s better not to have to fight. It is ironic that this sad lesson had to be relearned in the land of the Tigris and Euphrates, the cradle of civilization.
