But the historical record of countries that say they won’t negotiate with terrorists is far more complicated than such rhetoric suggests. In fact, almost every country that has been faced with terrorist demands has flinched at some point–or, at least, found ways to navigate between its principles and its desperate search for practical results. That includes the United States, which values its alliance with South Korea and doesn’t want to be seen as blocking a breakthrough in the current impasse. Looking at what Washington and others have done in the past, Seoul may have reason to believe that the issue isn’t quite as black and white as it now appears. By pledging to withdraw its aid workers from Afghanistan and seeking talks with Taliban officials, South Korea had already signaled its flexibility. Now it is hoping that the Karzai government can get the tacit approval of Washington to work something out–if it can be presented in such a way that it isn’t seen as a case of abandoning its principles.
When their own countrymen are the victims of terrorism, many countries have both negotiated with terrorists and, in some cases, effectively paid them off. The Brits held secret talks with the Irish Republican Army back in 1991, even after the IRA had launched a mortar attack at the prime minister’s office that could have killed the entire British cabinet. The Spanish negotiated with Basque separatists in 1988, just six months after the group had killed 21 people in a supermarket bombing. Even Israel, known for its forceful stance on terrorism, has both negotiated with groups it labeled as terrorists and released prisoners at key moments, although usually denying that these amounted to direct quid pro quos. And just last month, the French government secured a deal with Libya for the release of five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor, in exchange for millions of dollars for its health sector and a nuclear cooperation deal.
The United States has also skirted its own guidelines on several occasions. When militant Iranian students took more than 50 Americans hostage in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979, demanding the extradition of the ailing Shah of Iran from the United States, President Jimmy Carter tried a variety of measures to win their release: an oil embargo, severing diplomatic relations and an abortive military rescue mission. After 444 days in captivity, the hostages were finally freed in a deal brokered by Algeria. That deal included a pledge by Washington not to intervene in Iran’s internal affairs and the removal of a freeze on its assets. During the Reagan administration, the famed Iran-Contra affair involved a complicated deal between Washington and Tehran. The Americans delivered weapons to Iran, and the secret profits were used to fund Contra rebels in Nicaragua. Significantly, part of the deal was meant to help free a group of 30 Westerners, including six Americans, who has been seized by the Iranian-backed Hizbullah movement in Lebanon. When Lebanese gunmen hijacked TWA Flight 847 en route from Athens to Rome in 1985, they demanded the release of large numbers of prisoners held in Israeli prisons. Just as in the case of the Korean hostages in Afghanistan, the terrorists promptly executed one hostage and threatened to follow suit with the others. To avoid any overt violation of its principle of not giving in to terrorist extortion, Washington refused to request that Israel release the prisoners. But it acknowledged that it would welcome such a move. The remaining hostages on the plane were eventually freed, and Israel soon released some of its prisoners. But everyone denied any direct quid pro quo.
Even when governments bend to pressure, though, there’s no guarantee that hostages will be freed. In Afghanistan last March, Karzai gave in to pressure from Italy to meet the demands of the Taliban abductors of an Italian journalist and two Afghans who accompanied him. The Italian was freed, but the Taliban killed the two Afghans. And one of the freed Taliban commanders, Mansour Dadullah, is now directing suicide bombings and other attacks against Afghan and American forces from his redoubt on the Afghan-Pakistan border. All of which prompted scathing criticism of the deal by the United States and some Europeans. Besides, the Taliban has continued to kidnap hostages, whether or not those actions are rewarded by concessions. Apart from the Koreans, the group has abducted at least 41 Afghan civilians and killed at least 23 of them, while 18 remain missing, according to Human Rights Watch. Why do terrorists resort to such behavior no matter what happens? Even when they don’t get the concessions they want, “they still show that they can mall the face of the bear, and in the process humiliate their enemy,” says Simon of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Given that record, many American analysts believe that South Koreans need to think about the broader implications of any concessions to the terrorists. That’s easier said than done, since Koreans are understandably focused on the plight of their hostages. All of which could exacerbate U.S.-South Korean tensions since some Koreans may find it easy to pin the blame on Washington if the hostage crisis isn’t resolved peacefully. “They’re having a difficult time putting their situation into the larger context,” says the Asia Society’s Charles Armstrong, a history professor at Columbia University who just returned from South Korea. “South Koreans by and large feel the U.S. is being unsympathetic to their cause.”
But precisely because they have faced several hostage situations of their own, Americans are sympathetic. The Bush administration is also acutely aware of the fact that it needs to do what it can to help a key ally. Nonetheless, American officials and analysts recognize that any overt concessions can easily backfire. The question is whether the murky history of past hostage situations and their denouements can offer any hope for a solution to the current crisis that may be equally murky–but could still save lives.
